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Abstract
In this paper I investigate whether changes in the availability of direct democratic
institutions in local Swiss jurisdictions aﬀect expenditure decentralization. By using a
panel-based diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimation I ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in decentralization when the mandatory ﬁscal referendum is introduced at the local
level. This result is consistent with the proposed theoretical framework. Direct democ-
racy increases citizens' awareness of governments' behaviour which eventually aﬀects
politicians' electoral incentives. When oﬃcials from two diﬀerent levels of government
share the responsibility for the provision of public goods, they ﬁnd it convenient for
electoral purposes to favor expenditures where citizens have the lowest control over
government actions.
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1 Introduction
Recently there has been a growing interest in direct democratic institutions as an instru-
ment for sub-federal jurisdictions to remodel their relationships with central authorities.
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For example, in the European Union many sub-national jurisdictions use referenda on inde-
pendence as a shortcut, or threat, to reach a higher autonomy from the central government
(e.g., Scotland in UK, Cataluña in Spain and Veneto in Italy). Of the same nature is the
referendum promised by the UK prime minister David Cameron about the intention to leave
the European Union.
Interestingly, only a few papers have assessed the eﬀect of direct democracy on ﬁscal
decentralization. In a theoretical contribution Redoano and Scharf (2004) suggest that
centralization of tasks is more likely to occur under a representative democracy. However,
the only two empirical analyses have produced conﬂicting results. On the one hand, Feld
et al. (2008) show that Swiss cantons (states) which allow for ﬁscal referenda experience
a higher level of decentralization. On the other hand, Funk and Gathmann (2011), again
using a sample of Swiss cantons, conclude that direct democratic institutions produce no
eﬀects on the allocation of public expenditure between levels of government.
Although the two empirical applications are diﬀerent in terms of period of time con-
sidered and identiﬁcation strategy used, they both focus on a measure of decentralization
aggregated at the state level. The latter point constrains the analysis since variations of
direct democratic institutions at the local level cannot be taken into account. Such a condi-
tion would not be an issue if local authorities in Switzerland acted as pure agents following
decisions taken by higher level jurisdictions (i.e., cantonal and federal governments). This,
however, is not the case: Swiss municipalities play a central role in determining expenditure
decentralization as opposed to hierarchical subservience.
Therefore, this analysis wants to identify the eﬀect of direct democracy on decentral-
ization and, to add to the current body of works on the subject, this paper focus on local
level institutions. In order to do so, I employ a diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis on a panel
of 406 Swiss municipalities for a period of 20 years. Among these municipalities, 45 either
introduced or abolished one of the more relevant direct democratic institutions in Switzer-
land, namely the mandatory referendum on new expenditure. I show that direct democracy
at the local level decreases expenditure decentralization and the amount of transfers that a
lower level jurisdiction receives from the state level. These results are robust to a variety of
controls and, most importantly, they are still valid after I control for possible task assign-
ment and direct democratic institutional changes at the cantonal level. In addition, I apply
diﬀerent strategies that allow me to suggest a causal relationship between direct democracy
and decentralization.
These conclusions are in line with the prediction of a companion theoretical analysis.
In Switzerland, as in other countries, expenditure decentralization is mainly determined by
the tasks that are assigned at each level of government. However, Swiss citizens are called
to vote in favor or against a decision that aim at changing any pre-existent condition, which
means that task assignment does not boil down to a representative versus direct democracy
issue. For this reason, I set up a simple theoretical model linking direct democracy and
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decentralization by moving the intuition from the eﬀect that direct democracy might have
on task assignment to the eﬀect that direct democracy should have on governments' electoral
incentives and consequently on discretionary expenditures.
As such, I follow the political economy model from Joanis (2014) by putting substantial
attention on the vertical interaction between governments. In Switzerland, public goods
are often provided in a condition of partial decentralization where at least two levels of
government are jointly responsible for policy outcomes. Hence, governments have common
electoral incentives and citizens have imperfect information on each government's behav-
ior. Nevertheless, the latter point can be aﬀected by the presence of direct democratic
institutions which are expected to foster an increased availability of information (Benz and
Stutzer, 2007; Matsusaka, 2005). In this environment, both levels of government will ﬁnd it
convenient to move expenditure to where politicians are less exposed to citizens' scrutiny,
eventually aﬀecting the actual level of decentralization.
As a result, direct democratic institutions should produce two opposite eﬀects depending
on whether its inﬂuence on the information available to citizens is stronger at the local or
state level. Direct democracy positively aﬀects decentralization if it is stronger at the upper
level, whereas it negatively aﬀects decentralization if it is stronger at the lower level. My
analysis conﬁrms the latter prediction while, as already pointed out, the former one is
conﬁrmed by Feld et al. (2008) and rejected by Funk and Gathmann (2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces to the relevant
literature. Section 3 provides institutional background on Switzerland. Section 4 outlines
the model and the testable hypothesis, while Section 5 describes the dataset and the em-
pirical strategy. The results along with further robustness checks are reported in Sections 6
and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is mostly related with two distinct strands of literature. First, it is associated
with those studies that follow a political economy perspective in the analysis of decentral-
ization. This literature is also known as second generation theory of ﬁscal federalism (Oates,
2005). The main results show how political incentives can be important from either a nor-
mative or a positive analysis of decentralization.1 Second, there is a clear relation with
research that aims at ﬁnding how diﬀerent decision-making processes aﬀect public policies.
This research shows how countries allowing for direct legislation produce economic outcomes
that diﬀer from the ones of pure representative democracies.2
Although the two above mentioned strands of literature have independently produced
1See for example, Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Coate (2003), Bordignon et al. (2003), Brülhart
and Jametti (2006) and Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008).
2See for example, Matsusaka (1995), Gerber (1996), Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Matsusaka (2005) and
Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014).
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copious results, only a few studies predict how decision making process institutions (i.e.,
direct vs. representative democracy) can deﬁne the extent of ﬁscal decentralization.
From a theoretical point of view Redoano and Scharf (2004) look at the process of
centralization of tasks. In a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision, they compare
the outcome of this process under decisions taken directly by citizens and decisions taken
by elected representatives, respectively. The authors consider centralization as a form of
policy equalization across regions which occurs only if both jurisdictions are in agreement.
They show that centralization has a higher probability of success when the decisions are
taken through representative rather than direct democracy. Speciﬁcally, voters from a pro-
centralization jurisdiction can aﬀect delegates' conduct from a reluctant jurisdiction by
choosing representatives which present similar preferences. The same is not possible if the
decision is taken by a direct referendum.
This prediction focuses on situations in which task assignment boils down to a repre-
sentative versus direct democracy issue. This is not the case with regard to Switzerland
where, as in many other countries, task assignment is fairly stable over time and deﬁned
in federal and sub-federal constitutions. However, Swiss citizens are called to vote in favor
or against any change decided to existent constitutions, which means that task assignment
is essentially decided solely through direct legislation. Therefore, in order to better assess
Swiss institutions, unlike Redoano and Scharf (2004), I propose a model where task assign-
ment is assumed to be given and has a minor role in determining the diﬀerent levels of
decentralization that one might verify under diﬀerent decision making processes.
For this reason, following Joanis (2014), I assume decentralization to be endogenously
determined and largely aﬀected by political electoral incentives. He produces a theoretical
analysis assuming a condition of partial decentralization where more than one level of gov-
ernment provide a speciﬁc public good. The model is structured as a pure moral hazard
political agency model. Strategic behaviour arises because of asymmetric information of
governments with respect to voters, which eventually triggers a reduction on the account-
ability beneﬁts of decentralization. The primary results predict that decentralization is
dependent on relative rents from holding oﬃce, besides political conditions and competence
of both levels of government.3
However, unlike Joanis (2014), the proposed theoretical framework throughout this paper
exploits the role of direct democracy as a determinant of decentralization. In addition,
given that the model has mainly an heuristic purpose, I focus only on one of the plausible
theoretical channels, suggested by Matsusaka (2005), through which direct democracy aﬀects
public policies. According to the author there are three mechanisms through which direct
democracy aﬀects public policies: a reduction in the political agency problem, a higher
quality of information and a reduced possibility of logrolling.4 I only take into account direct
3Jametti and Joanis (2011, 2014) empirically conﬁrm the model's predictions.
4With respect to these three channels, Redoano and Scharf (2004) can be considered a good example of
4
democracy as an instrument capable to positively aﬀect citizens' information on politicians.
Two empirical analyses have been done to test the eﬀect of direct democracy on decen-
tralization. Both Funk and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008) show results by using
data on Swiss cantons. The latter conﬁrm the hypothesis that direct democracy encourages
decentralization, while the former did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of direct democracy on
the level of decentralization. One of the main diﬀerences in these two studies is the identiﬁca-
tion strategy. Feld et al. (2008) consider direct democracy as a predetermined characteristic
of cantons suggesting that endogeneity is a minor issue. Given this assumption, they rely
on a pooled cross section - time series analysis where a high number of controls are used to
compensate for the absence of ﬁxed eﬀects. Funk and Gathmann (2011), instead, allow the
eﬀect to be identiﬁed by those jurisdictions that experienced an institutional change over the
100-year period they consider. To do so, they control for unobserved heterogeneity among
jurisdictions by using ﬁxed eﬀects at the cantonal level. Further they tackle the potential
endogeneity issue by providing an instrumental variable approach in which they instrument
direct democratic institutions on the availability of the same institution in neighbouring
cantons and with the number of signatures needed to launch a constitutional initiative.
This paper attempts to complement the main limit of both studies, which rely on the
lack of analysis on all Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. Indeed, as I will explain in more
detail in Section 3, both Swiss cantons and municipalities experience large autonomy in
controlling the availability of direct democratic institutions as well as in tax setting and
public expenditure decisions. Therefore, the institutional settings of local jurisdictions are
likely to be important in deﬁning decentralization.
This study also complements Galletta and Jametti (2012). Here, the authors look at the
eﬀect of direct democracy on municipal expenditure by allowing for variations of institutions
over the two levels of government involved in the provision of public goods. They ﬁnd that
direct democracy at the state level is correlated with higher local public expenditure. How-
ever, this positive eﬀect is lower when the local government is availed of direct legislation.
Thus, the vertical interaction of diﬀerent decision-making process seems to play a role as
well.
3 The Swiss institutional setting
Switzerland is a federal country with three levels of government: national, cantonal and
municipal. Each tier has a similar share of total expenditure and revenue. This situation
has been quite stable over time: considering the period 1990-2009 the expenditure (revenue)
shares averaged 32% (31%) for federal, 41% (41%) for cantonal and 27% (28%) for local
administrations. Moreover, sub-central jurisdictions experience large autonomy in setting
how direct democratic institutions aﬀect decentralization by reducing the possibility of logrolling which are
present in a pure representative democracy
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both expenditures and revenues. In general, both cantons and municipalities levy taxes on
personal income and wealth as well as corporate income and capital. Note that the largest
contributions of revenue come from taxes on personal income.
Although a recent reform proposed a clearer division of tasks between cantonal and
federal levels, still, many tasks are jointly carried out with contributions from all levels
of government.5 Nevertheless, if not explicitly deﬁned in the Swiss constitution, decisions
concerning the actual division of tasks are mainly taken by cantons. Table 1 shows the
ﬁnancial eﬀort, of cantons and municipalities, for diﬀerent categories of public services.
All three levels of government democratically elect executive and legislative branches.6
Moreover, they can provide a variety of direct democratic instruments at the citizens' dis-
posal. Once again, the available instruments vary depending on the canton and municipality
considered, as deﬁned by the constitution of each jurisdiction. 7
Apart from the communal assembly, initiatives and referenda are the most common
instruments of direct democracy. Through initiatives, citizens directly promote new laws,
or the modiﬁcation of old ones, while referenda allow them to conﬁrm or deny a previous
decision taken by the legislative branch. A referendum can be optional or mandatory. In
the ﬁrst case, the referendum takes place only after citizens collect a certain number of
signatures within a deﬁned interval of time, while in the latter all new decisions have to be
conﬁrmed by popular vote.
As part of the empirical analysis, I consider mandatory ﬁscal referendum on new ex-
penditure, similar to precedential research. Notably, for sub-central jurisdictions this is a
predominant type of referendum. This type of budget referendum makes it compulsory for
governments to ask citizens the approval for any speciﬁc expenditure (once or repeated)
that exceeds a given threshold.
Before moving to the following sections, it is worth noting an important aspect that
aﬀects, for diﬀerent reasons, both the theoretical model and the empirical application of
this paper: in each level of government, a constitutional reform requires in principle the
citizens' approval. In other words, both task assignment and direct democratic institutions
availability depend on citizens decisions. From a theoretical perspective, this forces me to
move away from the intuition of Redoano and Scharf (2004) and to assume task assignment
as a predetermined condition with respect to the mechanisms deﬁning the actual level of
expenditure decentralization. As for the empirical aspect, I must deal carefully with the
5In 2004 citizens approved the so called Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung
which entered in force 2006.
6In many small municipalities the legislative branch is the communal assembly in which decisions are
taken directly by citizens. There are also municipalities in which both the municipal council and the assembly
coexist.
7According to cantonal laws, municipalities might present limited autonomy in deciding reforms to the
already available direct democratic institutions. Indeed, Micotti and Bützer (2003) note that municipalities
belonging to non-German speaking regions are largely constrained to use those instruments dictated by the
cantons.
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potential endogenous decision of a municipality to reform direct democratic institutions.
4 Model
4.1 The economic framework
To be consistent with the Swiss institutional setting, the theoretical structure draws on
Joanis (2014) where the vertical interaction of diﬀerent governments' characteristics have
been found to present a major impact on decentralization.
There are two time periods t = 1, 2 and two levels of government i = s, l (state and
local) that jointly provide a public good g in a given local jurisdiction where citizens have
homogeneous preferences.8 Citizens' preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear utility
function.
u(g, c) = gσ + c (1)
where 0 < σ < 1 while g and c are the consumption of a public and a private good
respectively.
The output of the public good is given by a CES production function in which the inputs
depend on the contribution of each level of government:
g = ((gs)θ + (gl)θ)
1
θ , (2)
where 0 < θ < 1, which implies that the inputs are not perfect substitutes. It is worth
noting that, diﬀerently from Joanis (2014), the two governments are assumed to be equally
competent in the provision of the public good.
Each government levies a lump sum tax xi such that
X = xs + xl, with xi = τgi, (3)
is the amount that citizens devote to taxes. τ is the unit cost of production, which is
assumed to be equal for both levels of government.
Finally, all citizens have an endowment of the private good, y, which is either consumed
or used to pay taxes
y = X + c. (4)
4.2 Politicians, voters and elections
Governments from the two levels are assumed to obtain utility from being in oﬃce. In other
terms, politicians seek reelection because they receive ego-rents from holding oﬃce (e.g.,
the prestige of power).
8Given that citizens are homogeneous the population is normalized to one.
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Let us assume that the cost of production, τ , is unknown by voters. Further, voters have
imperfect information on each government's contribution to the provision of public good gi
and, in addition to Joanis (2014), on the actual level of public good, g.
With reference to these assumptions, a crucial point in the model is played by the
interrelation between the decision making process and voters' information about the actions
of politicians. The ability of voters in to understand the real spending eﬀort exerted by each
government is strongly related with the type of decision making process they experience.
Here, it is assumed that direct and representative democracy imply diﬀerent outcomes in
terms of citizens' information about political issues. While in the former, decisions are
taken directly by citizens, or at least they are responsible to conﬁrm politicians' decisions,
in the latter, oﬃcials act with no immediate control. Information is more easily accessible
under direct democracy because it allows both a higher level of transparency and a higher
participation in the public debates preceding policy decisions. Benz and Stutzer (2007)
provide detailed empirical and theoretical ﬁndings that validate this argument.
I develop this basic insight by introducing in the model δi ∈ [0, 1], which is a parameter
positively related with the availability of direct democratic institutions in a jurisdiction.
The closer δi is to 1, the greater the citizen's capacity to clearly assess the level of public
expenditure. Both governments know the values of these parameters while citizens, though
aware of the relationship between δ and information transparency, cannot observe their ac-
tual values. Hence, by taking into account the eﬀect of direct democracy on information,
citizens are expected to observe g˜i = (δi)−1gi from a contribution gi. It is worth noting
that, for all values of δ, g˜i > gi. Therefore, there is the implicit assumption that vot-
ers will systematically overestimate public expenditure. This is coherent with a situation
in which voters trust incumbents' pre-electoral announcement about implemented policies
while politicians, by behaving rationally, claim a level of expenditure higher than the actual
one.
Finally, I assume that elections take place at both levels at the end of period 1. Therefore,
voters will elect, at each level, either the incumbent or the challenger to be in power in period
2. I assume that the probability of reelection is positively related to the perceived utility
u˜(g˜, c) according to a function F (u˜), where F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0 and 0 < F (u˜) < 1. As in Joanis
(2014) one might interpret the function F as the probability that the utility experienced by
citizens is higher than a random threshold that would make citizens willing to reelect the
incumbent. Therefore, even if the probability of reelection depends on F for both levels,
one might still expect divergent election outcomes between the two governments because
of the randomness of the election rule. Hence, each government will choose gi such that it
maximizes its own probability of reelection. All considered, reelections will be aﬀected by
the decision making process at both levels of government eventually determining the level
of decentralization.
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4.3 Decentralization equilibrium
The model can now be solved to derive the equilibrium level of decentralization in the ﬁrst
period of the game.
Remembering that governments have to take into account citizens' assessment on each
level of contribution, instead of the real eﬀort, we obtain:
max
gi
F (((gi(δi)
−1
)θ + (g−i(δ−i)−1)θ)
σ
θ + y − τ(gi + g−i)), (5)
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization problem in (5) we get the two best
response functions
0 = F ′(·)
[
σ(δl)
−1
(gl(δl)
−1
)θ−1((gl(δl)−1)θ + (gs(δs)−1)θ)
σ
θ
−1 − τ
]
, (6)
0 = F ′(·)
[
σ(δs)−1(gs(δs)−1)θ−1((gl(δl)−1)θ + (gs(δs)−1)θ)
σ
θ
−1 − τ
]
, (7)
for the local and the state government, respectively.
By solving equation (6) and (7) for an interior solution, we ﬁnd the spending ratio of
equilibrium in a speciﬁc local jurisdiction:
gl
gs
=
(
δl
δs
) θ
θ−1
≈ DEC (8)
is the main component in the usual deﬁnition of decentralization (i.e., g
l
gl+gs
).
By looking at Equation (8), both δl and δs play a central role in determining how much
a municipality spends in its territory compared to how much the state spends there. Not-
ing that the exponent is negative, the higher (lower) the value of δl, due to the presence
(absence) of direct democratic institutions at the local level, the lower (higher) the level
of decentralization. On the contrary, the higher (lower) the value of δs, the higher (lower)
the level of decentralization. The strength of these relationships depends on θ, which cap-
tures the degree of complementarity between the public goods provided by the two tiers of
governments. Therefore, the higher the value of θ (i.e., a lower complementarity level), the
stronger the eﬀect of changes in the value of δl and δs on decentralization.
How do we explain this result? Citizens vote for the incumbent when they perceive that
spending in the public goods is adequate to satisfy their preferences. However, citizens'
beliefs about the provision of public goods are aﬀected to a large extent by the availability
of transparent information. In the model, this hinges on the presence of direct democratic
instruments. Thus, each government ﬁnds it convenient to allocate expenditure to the level
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that has the lowest presence of direct democratic instruments so that it can claim a higher
level of expenditure (i.e., a higher supply of public services) during the electoral campaign.
By doing so, they both increase their probability of reelection. Indeed, for a given level of
expenditure gi, the lower δi (i.e., absence of direct democratic institutions), the higher the
positive eﬀect on the probability of election. However, this mechanism depends also on the
level of complementarity between the services provided by the two governments: the higher
the level of substitutability, the stronger the eﬀect of direct democracy on decentralization
as it is less expensive to move expenditure from one level to another.
Hypothesis - The introduction (or strengthening) of direct democratic institutions at
the local level decreases decentralization, while the introduction (or strengthening) of direct
democratic institutions at the state level increases decentralization.
In the following sections I empirically test the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis by using
changes to Swiss direct democratic institutions that occurred at the local level (municipali-
ties).
5 Data and empirical model
5.1 Data
The selection of my sample is the result of a number of steps that allow me to produce one
of the largest available datasets about Swiss municipalities including information that refers
to both institutional and public budget components.
This task has been accomplished under the Sinergia project The Swiss Confederation:
A Natural Laboratory for Research on Fiscal and Political Decentralization (n. 130648 /
147668) funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Initially, we have been provided
ﬁscal information of nearly 700 municipalities for the period 1990-2009 by the Swiss Federal
Department of Finance.9 To rely on a consistent set of data, I select those municipalities
meeting the following criteria: ﬁrst, they have provided information on categorical expendi-
ture for at least 15 years in the 20-year period considered; second, they have not experienced
either a merge with other municipalities, or a split, again in the 20-year period.
Unfortunately, in Switzerland, institutional details at the municipal level are not easy to
collect given that it does not exist any accessible uniﬁed database. Therefore, information is
included initially regarding the presence of the mandatory referendum on new expenditure
from Bützer (2007), which provides a detailed description of direct democratic institutions
9These are oﬃcial, but not published. More in detail, the data on public expenditure I am using are taken
from a survey done by the Swiss Ministry of Finance in 2009 in which it has been asked to a large sample
of municipalities to ﬁll a form with detailed information on their balance from 1990 to 2009 by following an
updated version of the Chart of Accounts and Functional Classiﬁcation.
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for 54 municipalities that belong to the sample. Secondly, 425 municipalities were contacted
by e-mail asking to provide all the diﬀerent versions of the municipal constitutions in force
starting from 1990. Eventually, answers from 352 municipalities were received, which pro-
vided information for at least two years. We reported a rate of response of 83%. From these
laws we completed a careful codiﬁcation of the availability of mandatory referendum on
new expenditure as well as an examination of the cantonal constitution when a municipality
speciﬁcally refers to it.
To sum up, I avail of an unbalanced panel of 406 Swiss municipalities belonging to the
26 Swiss cantons considering yearly observations for the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009
inclusive.10
In the empirical analysis, the main dependent variable considers the share of munic-
ipal per capita public expenditure of the total municipal and cantonal per capita public
expenditure. Hence, decentralizationi =
local expi p/c
local expi p/c+canton expc p/c
for a municipality i
in a canton c. Ideally, for coherence with the theoretical framework, I should have used
a dependent variable taking into account both municipal and cantonal expenditure for a
given municipality, such that decentralizationi =
local expi
local expi+canton expi
. Unfortunately, this
kind of information is not available in Switzerland due to state level expenditures being
not directly imputable to a speciﬁc municipality. Therefore, my dependent variable relies
on the assumption that citizens from one canton, regardless the municipality of residence,
experience the same cantonal amount of public good provision.
Funk and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008) have a similar limitation when con-
sidering aggregate centralization measure as a dependent variable. Basically, they assume
that each municipality in a canton has the same level of per capita expenditure.
Therefore, while this analysis adds to the body of work on the subject important infor-
mation on the availability of direct democratic institutions at a municipal level, it is still
constrained by missing information on cantonal expenditure. To circumvent this restriction,
I use an alternative dependent variable that takes into account speciﬁc cantonal ﬁnancial
support for each municipality. Share of transfers is the ratio between the municipal rev-
enue from cantonal transfers and municipal expenditure. This variable acts to complement
some of the limits of decentralization by making it possible to link the availability of direct
democracy in a speciﬁc municipality and a ﬁscal decision taken at the cantonal level that
concerns exactly that municipality.
The main explanatory variable is mandatory ref., which is equal to 1 if a municipality
avails itself of the mandatory referendum on new expenditure and 0 otherwise. Given to the
larger number of municipalities considered in my dataset, and contrary to previous research,
I found several institutional changes at the municipal level. Indeed, changes occurred only in
small municipalities, while the largest ones seem to have a more stable institutional setting.
Table 2 reports the numbers of municipalities by canton and the changes in institutions that
10Switzerland had 2596 municipalities at the beginning of 2010.
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were veriﬁed during the 20-year period considered at both municipal and cantonal level.
In the sample, 45 of the 406 municipalities changed their institutions (40 introduced
and 5 abolished the referendum). Figure 1 shows a map of the municipalities and where
they are located in Switzerland. Although not directly addressed, cantonal institutions are
also taken into account. Overall, changes in cantonal institutions occurred in 7 out of 26
cantons (Zurich, Bern, Obwalden, Neuchatel and Valais abolished the referendum; Aargau
introduced it; Vaud ﬁrst introduced and then remove it).
I include also socio-economic and political controls at the municipal level. By controlling
for Population I allow for economies of scale in the provision of public goods and control
for potential mechanical eﬀects due to the dependent variable that reports a per capita
measure. Dependency ratio and share of foreigner is included to shape citizens' preferences
concerning the provision of public goods. I also included the percentage of votes received by
the left-wing parties and the turnout in the closest national election.While the ﬁrst variable
is a proxy for political preferences of citizens, the second is a control for the degree of their
involvement in the political activity.
Finally, as reported in Table 3, I consider municipal ﬁxed characteristics from the ﬁrst
year of my panel to study the reasons why a municipality chooses to introduce a referendum.
These variables are either per se ﬁxed (i.e., area, urban, urban center, touristic center and
lake) or they represent municipal population's condition as revealed by the Swiss census
from the year 1990 (i.e., share pop. German speakers, share pop. primary sector, share pop.
inactive, share pop. university degree and share pop. protestant).
5.2 Empirical model
My aim is to identify the average impact of a municipal ﬁscal mandatory referendum on
decentralization. To do so I apply a linear regression model with a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimator where the treatment is the introduction of a ﬁscal mandatory referendum at the
local level. Therefore, the sample is composed by a treated group of 45 municipalities that
have decided to introduce or abolish the referendum, and a control group of 361 municipal-
ities that do not change their institutional setting. In other words, I compare the variation
in decentralization in the treatment group before and after the reform to the variation in de-
centralization in the control group. This strategy allows to control for both observable and
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity at a municipal level, which could be correlated
with the decision to reform and with the degree of decentralization.
Formally, the model I estimate is:
Yict = αi + λt + χct + γit+ βMunRefit + δXict + ict (9)
where i denotes the municipality, c the canton and t the year. The dependent variable Y is
the level of decentralization of expenditure. MunRefit is a dummy variable with value 1 or
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0 whether the municipality respectively avails or not of a mandatory ﬁscal referendum. αi
are municipal ﬁxed eﬀects and λt are year eﬀects. χct are canton-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects and
γit are municipal speciﬁc time trends. Xict are other control variables and ict is the error
term.
Find a causal eﬀects in this analysis is a challenging objective. The main concern, is that
municipal characteristics that vary over time are correlated with both decentralization and
the decision to reform. Although in section 5.2.1 I deal more formally with this issue, the
main analysis produces already rather robust results because it controls for a large portion
of municipal time-varying characteristics.
First, given that I rely on a panel data-set, I use municipal linear time trends. By doing
so I take care of the key parallel trend assumption and I control for both idiosyncratic
temporary shocks and diﬀerentials in macro trends.
Further, I include controls that allow me to better assess citizens' preferences. Interest-
ingly, Funk and Gathmann (2013) ﬁnd that direct democracy is stronger in those cantons
that are less supportive of public spending. One might expect that a similar relationship
holds for local jurisdictions too. Therefore, I control for voters' preferences by using the
share of votes in favor of left-wing political parties during national elections. Municipalities
with a strong preference for these parties might be more likely to prefer redistribution and
a higher level of expenditure (i.e., less ﬁscally conservative). In absence of such a control, I
might overestimate the eﬀect of a municipal referendum on decentralization.
Finally, I introduce canton-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. These terms allow me to absorb any
source of omitted variables at a cantonal level. The most important consequence is that
they also control for changes in task assignments as well as changes in the availability of
direct democratic institutions which occurred in all cantons for the time period considered.
As predicted by the theoretical model, decentralization should depend on the strength of
direct democratic institutions at both levels, under the assumption that task assignment
is predetermined (or exogenous). Therefore, the reliability of the analysis might be largely
reduced by omitting these controls.
In all the estimations, I use standard errors clustered two-ways by municipality and year
to adjust for any possible correlation in the error term due to the panel structure (Cameron
et al., 2011).
5.2.1 Causality
The empirical strategy described so far controls for both time-invariant unobservable and
some important time-varying observable heterogeneity. However, the decision of a munic-
ipality to introduce a ﬁscal referendum might be still correlated with time-varying unob-
servable features that also aﬀect decentralization. Therefore, to produce causal estimates it
needs to be shown that the timing and the decision to introduce a ﬁscal referendum appears
to be random conditional on the controls. A well-designed instrumental variable approach
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would be a natural strategy to deal with such an endogeneity issue. For example, Funk and
Gathmann (2011) use an instrumental strategy that relies on potential spatial correlation
between municipal institutions. They instrument direct democratic institutions by consid-
ering the presence of the same institution in neighbouring jurisdictions. Ideally, I would
use the same approach, but my sample does not allow me to have information on all neigh-
bouring jurisdictions of a speciﬁc municipality. Therefore, I might produce results that are
biased given that the instrument would be based on incomplete information. Nevertheless,
I apply a number of strategies in order to reduce the concern of endogeneity.
First, I estimate a discrete-time duration model of the probability of introducing a
ﬁscal referendum, following the procedure described by Jenkins (1995). Hence, I try to
exploit the reasons that make municipalities choose to reform. I consider the probability
of applying this reform as a function of both ﬁxed pre-treatment characteristics and time-
varying municipal characteristics. The latter group includes time-diﬀerences of the main
covariates and decentralization such that I test whether changes in these observable time-
varying variables aﬀect the probability of reforming direct democratic institutions. The aim
of this analysis is to verify whether reforms are mainly dependent on ﬁxed pre-treatment
attributes or on other important observed variables that change over-time. Therefore, if I
ﬁnd that changes in institutions are not due to the second set of characteristics, I should be
less worried about the omitted variable bias given that the presence of correlation between
the decision to introduce a ﬁscal referendum and other municipal time-varying unobserved
characteristics is less likely.11
Second, I look at the relative size of the omitted variable bias as suggested by Oster
(2014), which follows the work by Altonji et al. (2005). By assuming the selection on
observables as proportional to the selection on unobservables, I show how large it has to
be the eﬀect of unobservable characteristics so that the expected eﬀect of the referendum
on decentralization is canceled out. The greater the measure of inﬂuence has to be, the
lower is the concern about the presence of important omitted variable bias. In addition, an
identiﬁcation set for the treatment eﬀect is computed to check whether it excludes coeﬃcient
equal to zero for mandatory ref.. Speciﬁcally, I produce these tests by considering the
procedure described by Oster (2014). As an improvement with respect to Altonji et al.
(2005), this methodology takes into account, along with the variation of the estimated
coeﬃcient of interest due to the inclusion of additional controls, also the shift of R-squared.
In other words, I compare the change of mandatory ref. coeﬃcient and R-squared from one
uncontrolled regression and a number of controlled regressions.
Finally, I follow an approach in the spirit of a Granger (1969) test of causality as sug-
gested by Angrist and Pischke (2009). This analysis, akin to an event-study, allows to
11A similar approach to assess the degree of exogeneity of the reform has been carried out by Galiani
et al. (2005) where they study the eﬀects of water privatization in local jurisdictions in Argentina on child
mortality.
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produce additional results compared to the main analysis because it deals more formally
with the potential reverse causality issue and hints to the dynamics of the eﬀect. In this
case I estimate:
Yict = αi +λt +χct + γit+
4∑
τ=0
β−τMunRefi,t−τ +
4∑
τ=1
β+τMunRefi,t+τ + δXict + ict (10)
I add to the main speciﬁcation variables that identify lags and leads of 4 years with respect
to the institutional changes. Thus, to reduce the concern on possible anticipatory eﬀect I
should ﬁnd
∑4
τ=1 β+τ to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Diﬀerently, I might expect
to ﬁnd posttreatment eﬀect,
∑4
τ=0 β−τ , to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 with a negative
sign. Further, lagged coeﬃcients deﬁne the dynamic of the eﬀect for a relatively short period
after the introduction of the referendum.12
6 Results
6.1 Main results
Initial estimates of equation (9) are reported in Table 4. The ﬁrst three columns show that
overall direct democracy at the municipal level negatively aﬀects decentralization, conﬁrm-
ing the model's prediction. In the ﬁrst column I report the results that include a dummy
for the presence of the mandatory referendum, municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects
and municipal time trends to control for possible diﬀerent shocks or trends at the municipal
level. The results show that decentralization decreases once referendum is introduced. The
coeﬃcient suggests a reduction of decentralization of around 1.3 percentage-points. This
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%. Column (2) highlights that adding to
the previous speciﬁcation time-variant socio-demographic controls does not change neither
the size nor the level of signiﬁcance of the referendum coeﬃcient. Interestingly, among the
new covariates only municipal population is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This might
suggest that municipal time trends largely reduce the omitted variable bias, given that they
have enough power to control for important time-variant municipal attributes.
In column (3), the coeﬃcient of interest is again negative, but now it turns to be sig-
niﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. By adding canton-year ﬁxed eﬀects, I control for any
change that happened at the cantonal level over the period considered. The estimated co-
eﬃcient suggests a reduction of decentralization of 2 percentage-points by the introduction
of a referendum at the local level. Basically, the identiﬁcation here is given by comparing
municipalities that change institutions with ones in the same canton that do not change in
12Ideally, I would have run a more in-depth study on the long term eﬀect by following a formal event-study
analysis. However, I believe that with only 45 treated municipalities I would not have produced reliable
estimations.
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a speciﬁc year. I consider this to be the most challenging identiﬁcation strategy because it
takes into account not only the diﬀerent municipal trends but also actual changes in can-
tonal task assignments or cantonal availability of direct democracy. This last consideration
is of particular interest because it allows me to go a step forward with respect to what has
already been done in the literature by Funk and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008).
I estimate the eﬀect of municipal referendum on decentralization conditional on changes at
the cantonal level so that I control for any omitted vertical eﬀects related with the dependent
variable.
However, even in my analysis, I am not yet able to asses the whole impact, given the
way in which the dependent variable is computed. Indeed, this is mainly aﬀected by changes
of municipal expenditures. So, the eﬀect of a municipal mandatory referendum on cantonal
expenditure is not directly identiﬁed. Nevertheless, theoretically this is expected to make
the negative eﬀect of direct democracy on decentralization even larger, given that there
could be a substitution in expenditure between municipal and cantonal governments.
For this reason, the last three columns of Table 4 exploit the eﬀect of the reforms on the
share of transfers.13 These regressions are focused on the revenue side of municipalities. The
coeﬃcient of primary interest is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 in all columns.
As in the analysis on decentralization, the referendum coeﬃcient does not change from
column (4), where additionally to ﬁxed eﬀects I include municipal time trends, to column
(5), where I include also time-varying controls. The coeﬃcient of mandatory ref. entails a
reduction of the dependent variable of 2.8 percentage-points once a municipality introduces
the direct vote on public expenditure. In the last column, the main variable of interest
results signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence interval level. The introduction of a referendum at
the local level decreases the share of expenditure ﬁnanced through cantonal grants by 2.1
percentage-points when controlling for any change occurred at a cantonal level as well.
These additional results conﬁrm empirically that, by introducing a referendum at the
local level, there is a direct eﬀect also on cantonal ﬁscal decisions. Although the theoretical
model does not have predictions for this part of the analysis, the negative coeﬃcient could
be coherent with the pattern expected from the theoretical background. Policies promoted
by municipalities that introduced referendum are now more transparent for citizens, which
entails that their eﬀort to increase the probability of reelection is more expensive than
before. Thus, cantons rationally reduce transfers to these municipalities, possibly allowing
for an increase in their direct expenditure.
13Here, due to data constraints, the sample takes into accounts 372 municipalities of which 45 are treated
and 327 are non treated.
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6.2 Causality
6.2.1 Discrete-time duration model
Table 5 shows the diﬃculty in ﬁnding characteristics that signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability
of a municipality to introduce a ﬁscal referendum. Here, I consider only those municipalities
that in 1990, the ﬁrst year of the panel, do not present a ﬁscal referendum. By following
Jenkins (1995), I run a logit model where the dependent variable, mandatory ref., is trun-
cated after the year of introduction of a referendum for those municipalities that reform.
All speciﬁcations include a ﬁfth-order polynomial to control for duration dependence and
errors are clustered at the municipal level.
In column (1) I look mainly at feedback eﬀects from decentralization to the probability of
reforming, by including changes in decentralization lagged from 1 to 3 years. These variables
do not seem to be correlated with the decision to reform. I add in column (2) the observed
time-varying variables already used in the main analysis, considering their ﬁrst diﬀerence.
As for decentralization, they do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability to reform. Finally,
I complete the analysis by including several ﬁxed pre-treatment municipal characteristics.
Once again, they are not generally able to explain reform decisions. Only the share of
inactive population is correlated with a lower probability of reform.
Interestingly, none of the time-varying variables reaches satisfying levels of signiﬁcance.
This seems to be true also for almost the totality of the ﬁxed controls. To some degree,
this analysis reduces the concern about potential correlation between control variables and
the decision to reform. Importantly, if considered from a diﬀerent perspective, this result
suggests that it is less likely that the decision to reform is correlated with unobserved time-
varying characteristics, given that it is already uncorrelated with the observable ones.
6.2.2 Selection on unobservables.
The last two rows of Table 6 report signiﬁcant information about the potential eﬀect of the
omitted variable bias on my estimates.14 The controlled regressions in column (2), (3) and
(4) of Table 6 replicate respectively the speciﬁcation of column (1), (2) and (3) of Table 4,
while the uncontrolled regression includes as covariates only mandatory ref. and municipal
ﬁxed eﬀects. By having municipal ﬁxed eﬀects in the uncontrolled regression, I implicitly get
rid of a portion of the omitted variable bias that would rely on time invariant heterogeneity
among municipalities.
The second last row shows the value of δ (i.e., the degree of proportionality) such that
the estimated coeﬃcient of mandatory ref. is 0. I assume Rmax = 1. Interestingly, all
columns report δ > 1. It ranges from a value of 1.25 in column (2) to a value of 28.29 in
column (4). This test suggests that, by taking into account my preferred speciﬁcation in
14For further details and a formal derivation of δ and of the identiﬁcation set see Oster (2014). All
calculations are made using PSACALC stata module by Oster (2013).
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column (4), selection on unobservables has to be at least 28 time stronger than selection on
observables to invalidate the results. Therefore, it is unlikely that the eﬀect of referendum
on decentralization is mainly due to unobservables.
The last row gives a further validation to my main analysis by providing identiﬁcation
sets which give bounds to the diﬀerent estimated coeﬃcients. Here I assume an equal
level of proportionality between observables and unobservables selection (i.e., δ = 1), and
again Rmax = 1. None of the estimated sets include positive values. Interestingly, the
preferred speciﬁcation has a very limited identiﬁcation set which largely conﬁrms a reduction
of decentralization due to the introduction of a referendum of about 2 percentage-points.
6.2.3 Granger causality and dynamics
The estimation of Equation 10 is reported in Table 7. The ﬁrst two terms are in the
order the sum of the lag coeﬃcients and the sum of the lead coeﬃcients. Interestingly, the
latter is not signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation, meaning that we can rule out concerns about
reverse causality. Moreover, the inclusion of cantonal-year ﬁxed eﬀects, shown in column
(3), reveals that post-treatment eﬀects are negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, as one
might expect. Although this result does not challenge directly the potential endogeneity
issue, it emphasizes the direction of the eﬀect: the institutional variation comes before the
change in the level of decentralization.
Figure 2 gives more information on the pattern of the eﬀects by showing the estimated
coeﬃcients of lags and leads, and their conﬁdence intervals. Apart from the second year
before the change, all coeﬃcients are negative. However, just the lags are signiﬁcantly
negative. Moreover, the largest jump of decentralization appears the year of change. A
further reduction arrives the ﬁrst year after the reform, while from the second year there
is a stabilization of the negative eﬀect. In conclusion, the introduction of the referendum
aﬀects decentralization not only in the year of change: indeed, it seems to be present up to
4 years after the reform.
7 Sensitivity analysis
The results from my main analysis are all based on a diﬀerence in diﬀerences analysis,
which denotes a comparison between a control and a relatively small treated group. Hence,
two further aspects need to be checked to conﬁrm the robustness of my results: the control
group's composition and the presence of outliers in the treatment group. On the one hand,
although I control for several characteristics and include diﬀerent ﬁxed eﬀects, the compo-
sition of the control group matters in deﬁning the eﬀect of direct democracy. On the other
hand, as already noted, the results of this analysis are mainly identiﬁed by 45 municipalities
which modiﬁed the provision of direct democratic instruments. Therefore, it is important
to check whether only a few of these municipalities drive the overall results. In this section
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I provide a series of robustness checks challenging the two issues just mentioned. Table 8
shows estimations based on the preferred speciﬁcation, column (3) of Table 4.
In the ﬁrst three columns I deal with the fact that the treated group is mainly composed
by small municipalities while in the control group also the largest ones are included. I
reduce the sample conditional on municipal's size: column (1) considers municipalities with
a population lower than 20,000, column (2) population lower than 10,000 and column (3)
population lower than 5,000. Again the main coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcation. The eﬀect is still around -2 percentage-points. In column (4), I consider
observations only from the treated group. This ﬁxed eﬀects model estimates diﬀerences
in the outcome before and after the treatment. Is important to note that in this way I
leave out potential selection bias driven by the control group composition by identifying an
average treatment eﬀect on the treated. Once again, the negative eﬀect of a mandatory
referendum on expenditure decentralization is conﬁrmed and it decreases decentralization
by 1.9 percentage-points.
In column (5) and (6) I show two diﬀerent regressions assessing the potential presence
of outliers in the treatment group.15 They both present results of the main speciﬁcation by
excluding from the analysis those municipalities showing anomalies in the residuals.
Column (5) excludes the municipalities of Wildberg (index 182) and Emmetten (index
1504). This decision is driven by a ﬁrst graphical analysis of Figure 3: it presents a scatter
graph in which the Y axis reports the residual of the preferred speciﬁcation by excluding the
dummy variable mandatory ref., while the X axis measures the residual from a regression in
which mandatory ref. is the dependent variable and the regressors are the same as the main
speciﬁcation. This graph allows me to focus on the relationship between decentralization
and the mandatory referendum excluding the other variables. The mentioned municipalities
show observations that behave unusually and that aﬀect the slope of the line representing
the coeﬃcient. In coherence with previous results, the coeﬃcient for mandatory ref. is
still negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 99% conﬁdence interval. However, it
increases from -0.020 of the main analysis to -0.014.
In column (6) I go further with respect to the graphical observation by removing all
those municipalities that present, for at least one year, a studentized residual with absolute
value higher than 3.16 This means that I drop 8 treated municipalities, two of which are
the ones already excluded. Although mandatory ref. coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant and with
negative sign, it increases a little to -0.013.
As a ﬁnal test, similarly to Lovenheim and Owens (2014), I run a simple permutation test
15This robustness check is also a way to compensate for possible mistakes in the reported information on
municipal public expenditure in the survey conducted by the Swiss Ministry of Finance.
16Studentized residuals are residuals corrected for their standard errors. They can be described as the t
statistic which would have a dummy variable on whether that speciﬁc observation would be included in the
regression or not. Thus, by assuming 3 as threshold, I implicitly exclude those observations for which the
dummy is signiﬁcant at the 1 % level (Belsley et al., 1980).
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where I regress my main speciﬁcation 45 times removing each time a treated municipality.17
Each estimation reports a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the dummy on municipal
referendum. The value ranges between -0.021 and -0.015.18 This test conﬁrms that there is
not a single municipality that deﬁnes the whole eﬀect.
Summing up, these results seem to add support to the expected negative eﬀect of local
direct democratic institutions on decentralization.
8 Conclusion and discussion
In this analysis I show that direct democracy aﬀects decentralization of expenditure in a
diﬀerent way than a pure representative democracy would.
From a theoretical perspective, I emphasize how direct democracy can work as an in-
formation tool that makes governments decisions more transparent and how this aﬀects
expenditure decentralization. When two or more levels of governments jointly provide a
public good, they become mutually responsible from a citizen's point of view. Thus, politi-
cians from diﬀerent levels who aim to be reelected have similar objective functions. To
maximize their probabilities of being in charge again the next period, they ﬁnd it con-
venient to move expenditure to the level where the control of citizens is the lowest (i.e.,
representative democracy) such that any electoral claims about the goodness of their activi-
ties is diﬃcult to verify. Therefore, the model predicts that decentralization should increase
if direct democracy is introduced at the cantonal level, while it should decrease if direct
democracy is introduced at the local level.
I empirically test the second point of the prediction by using a newly assembled dataset
which considers a sample of 406 Swiss municipalities over a period of 20 years. In this
sample 45 municipalities either introduced or abolished a mandatory referendum on new
expenditure. Thanks to these changes over time, I can use a diﬀerence in diﬀerences ap-
proach conﬁrming that decentralization, decreases once a municipality strengthens citizen's
participation. By using a number of strategies I importantly reduce the concern about the
potential omitted variable bias so that I can suggest a causal interpretation of the results.
First, I show that the decision to reform taken by municipalities is not correlated with time-
varying variables. Second, I evaluate that in order to invalidate the eﬀect of referendum on
decentralization, selection based on unobservables has to be extremely bigger than selection
on observables. Finally, I do not ﬁnd any anticipatory eﬀects while posttreatment eﬀect are
present and coherent with the ﬁnding of the main analysis. As developed out from Funk
and Gathmann (2011) and Feld et al. (2008), given my main focus on municipalities instead
of cantons, the results are robust to changes that might have occurred at all levels of gov-
17Lovenheim and Owens (2014) test how public aids limitation to students convicted for drug oﬀenses
aﬀects their education achievements. Interestingly, they deal with a small treated group composed by 46
students.
18Detailed results are displayed in Table 9.
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ernment (i.e., municipalities and cantons) either in terms of task assignments or availability
of direct legislation instrument.
I estimate a reduction of 2 percentage-points of decentralization, which calculated at the
mean suggests a decrease of decentralization of about 5%. To produce a numerical result, let
us assume that the introduction of the mandatory referendum makes expenditure move from
the municipal to the cantonal level, with no eﬀect on the total amount of expenditure. On
average a municipality from the sample spends around 4,600 CHF and a canton 8,000 CHF
per capita. Therefore, as a pure speculative consequence, the introduction of a mandatory
referendum on new expenditure would decrease the per capita local expenditure of 700
CHF with a respective increase in the cantonal one. To put it diﬀerently, that would
suggest a reduction of expenditure at the municipal level of nearly 15%. The empirical
estimation suggests that the same eﬀect would occur if, holding other characteristics ﬁxed,
the population in a municipality decreases by about 10%.
Additionally, the paper discovers that direct democracy seems to aﬀect negatively and
signiﬁcantly the amount of local expenditure funded at the cantonal level. This point
highlights again the presence of a vertical interaction between decision making processes
and policy decisions.
Finally, I believe, regardless of the main objective of the research, these ﬁndings make
clear that studies on federations need a more thorough examination of conditions that
does not solely refer to the level of government in analysis. Vertical interactions between
governments signiﬁcantly aﬀect public policies. By omitting from the analysis characteristics
of other level jurisdictions might limit the overall reliability of the results.
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Reforms to fiscal referendum in the period 1990-2009:
No (control group)
Yes (treated group)
No data
Location of municipalities in the sample
25 0 25 50 75 100 km
Figure 1: Location of municipalities in the sample.
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Figure 2: Leads and Lags coeﬃcients.
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Figure 3: Outliers - AVplot.
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Table 1: Destination of public expenditure by level of government in percentage, 2009
Cantons Municipalities
Administration 44% 56%
Security 71% 29%
Education 63% 37%
Culture 34% 66%
Health 87% 13%
Welfare 61% 39%
Transport 57% 43%
Environment 22% 78%
Economy 72% 28%
Total 60% 40%
Source: Swiss Federal Department of Finance
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Table 2: Sample details
Canton Abbreviation N. of N. of Cantonal level
municipalities
in the sample
municipal
reforms
reforms (year)
Aargau AG 28 1 Yes (2003)
Appenzell Ausserrhoden AR 17 0 No
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI 3 0 No
Basel-Landschaft BL 59 0 No
Basel-Stadt BS 2 0 No
Bern BE 34 5 Yes (1993)
Fribourg FR 1 0 No
Geneva GE 8 0 No
Glarus GL 1 0 No
Graubünden GR 19 2 No
Jura JU 2 0 No
Lucerne LU 35 2 No
Neuchâtel NE 6 0 Yes (2002)
Nidwalden NW 9 3 No
Obwalden OW 7 0 Yes (1999)
Schaﬀhausen SH 15 4 No
Schwyz SZ 3 0 No
Solothurn SO 9 2 No
St. Gallen SG 34 2 No
Thurgau TG 2 0 No
Ticino TI 2 0 No
Uri UR 14 3 No
Valais VS 7 0 Yes (1994)
Vaud VD 11 0 Yes (1999-2004)
Zug ZG 4 0 No
Zürich ZH 74 21 Yes (1999)
TOT - 406 45 7
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
Expenditure Decentralization p/c 0.367 0.089 0.077 0.651 6646
Share of transfers 0.099 0.081 0 1 4305
Independent variables
Mandatory ref. 0.515 0.5 0 1 6646
Population (Log) 8.52 1.179 4.522 12.818 6646
Share pop foreigner 0.165 0.094 0 0.527 6646
Dependency ratio 0.63 0.083 0.375 1.002 6646
Left wing 0.259 0.121 0 0.896 6619
Turnout 0.448 0.092 0.146 0.817 6619
Discrete-time Hazard model
Area 17.327 26.574 1.3 203.9 2577
Urban 0.579 0.494 0 1 2577
Urban center 0.107 0.31 0 1 2577
Touristic center 0.025 0.157 0 1 2577
Lake 0.246 0.431 0 1 2577
Share pop German speaker 72.745 33.375 0.729 100 2577
Share pop primary sector 5.689 6.487 0.26 34.043 2577
Share pop inactive 1.997 1.122 0 6.383 2577
Share pop university degree 11.905 4.452 2.355 27.298 2577
Share pop protestant 42.788 24.587 0.594 88.116 2577
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Table 4: Impact of ﬁscal referendum on decentralization
Decetralization Share of transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. -0.013* -0.013* -0.020*** -0.028** -0.028** -0.021*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Population (Log) -0.170*** -0.215*** 0.000 0.048
(0.040) (0.044) (0.074) (0.077)
Share pop foreigner 0.012 -0.041 0.439* 0.135
(0.077) (0.064) (0.228) (0.188)
Dependency ratio -0.047 0.002 0.038 -0.065
(0.079) (0.073) (0.166) (0.149)
Left wing -0.019 0.002 0.036 -0.147**
(0.016) (0.031) (0.063) (0.067)
Turnout -0.010 0.064** -0.051 0.007
(0.024) (0.026) (0.045) (0.066)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.900 0.902 0.921 0.707 0.709 0.809
N 6646 6619 6619 4289 4270 4270
Notes: In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal share of
cantonal and municipal expenditures. In columns (4) to (6) the dependent variable is Share of transfers which is
calculated as cantonal transfers share of municipal expenditures. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors
clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Discrete-time hazard estimation of the probability to introduce referendum
(1) (2) (3)
Time-varying variables
∆ Decentralizationt−1 -8.373 -8.402 -7.027
(11.737) (11.295) (10.378)
∆ Decentralizationt−2 -0.345 0.045 -0.670
(10.407) (9.990) (9.842)
∆ Decentralizationt−3 2.774 2.467 2.746
(3.847) (3.695) (3.698)
∆ Populationt−1 (Log) -1.231 -1.325
(6.691) (6.987)
∆ Share pop foreignert−1 1.368 0.625
(20.348) (20.867)
∆ Dependency ratiot−1 -33.631 -31.828
(23.624) (29.233)
∆ Left wingt−1 -6.590 -8.140
(4.896) (5.505)
∆ Turnoutt−1 0.028 0.034
(0.030) (0.034)
Fixed pre-treatment variables (1990)
Area (mun) 0.002
(0.010)
Urban (mun) -0.061
(0.530)
Urban center dummy (mun) 1.036
(1.411)
Turistic (mun) 0.553
(1.175)
Lake (mun) 0.082
(0.622)
Share pop. German speakers (mun) 0.018
(0.016)
Share pop. employed in the primary sector -0.034
(0.038)
Share pop. inactive -1.058***
(0.296)
Share pop. university degree 0.091
(0.068)
Share pop. protestant 0.003
(0.009)
2594 2594 2577
Notes: The dependent variable is mandatory (ref). A ﬁfth-order polynomial is used to con-
trol for duration dependence. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by
municipality. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Selection on unobservables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncontrolled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Coeﬃcient -0.02083 -0.01322 -0.01347 -0.02030
R-squared 0.825 0.900 0.902 0.921
δ 1.25 1.36 28.29
Identiﬁed Set [-0.01322,-0.00305] [-0.01347,-0.00412] [-0.02030,-0.01986]
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization. The reported coeﬃcients are those of mandatory ref.. The
uncontrolled regression includes only municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. The controlled regressions recall the speciﬁca-
tions from column (1) to (3) of Table 4. δ is calculated assuming Rmax = 1 and β = 0. The identiﬁed set is
calculated assuming Rmax = 1 and δ = 1.
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Table 7: Impact of ﬁscal referendum on decentralization with Leads and Lags
(1) (2) (3)
Mandatory ref.
∑4
τ=0 β−τ -0.033 -0.039 -0.080***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.026)
Mandatory ref.
∑4
τ=1 βτ 0.004 0.000 -0.019
(0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
Population (Log) -0.171*** -0.217***
(0.041) (0.044)
Share pop foreigner 0.013 -0.036
(0.077) (0.065)
Dependency ratio -0.045 0.010
(0.079) (0.073)
Left wing -0.019 0.001
(0.016) (0.031)
Turnout -0.010 0.063**
(0.024) (0.026)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
R2 0.900 0.902 0.921
N 6646 6619 6619
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as
municipal share of cantonal and municipal expenditures. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by
year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mandatory ref. -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.018* -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Population (Log) -0.214*** -0.202*** -0.220*** -0.082 -0.227*** -0.231***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.067) (0.080) (0.044) (0.045)
Share pop foreigner -0.056 -0.085 -0.069 0.096 -0.055 -0.059
(0.068) (0.069) (0.083) (0.195) (0.065) (0.066)
Dependency ratio -0.007 -0.008 -0.029 -0.178 0.005 0.011
(0.074) (0.080) (0.087) (0.262) (0.073) (0.068)
Left wing 0.000 0.008 0.038 0.041 0.005 0.007
(0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.126) (0.031) (0.030)
Turnout 0.061** 0.062** 0.056 -0.034 0.074*** 0.071***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.090) (0.024) (0.024)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton × year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.908 0.885 0.864 0.909 0.924 0.925
N 6060 4551 2633 798 6581 6475
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal share of cantonal and municipal
expenditures. Column (1) considers municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, column (2) considers municipalities
with less than 10,000 inhabitants and column (3) considers municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants. Column (4)
includes treated municipalities. Column (5) considers all municipalities but Wildberg (index 182) and Emmetten (index
1504) while column (6) considers all municipalities but the treated ones with a studentized residual with absolute value
higher than 3 for at least one year. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality
and by year. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis - Permutation test
Index Excluded Municipality Coeﬃcient Stand. Error Index Excluded Municipality Coeﬃcient Stand. Error
10 -0.020*** 0.005 1099 -0.018*** 0.006
23 -0.019*** 0.006 1203 -0.018*** 0.005
28 -0.019*** 0.006 1214 -0.019*** 0.005
54 -0.019*** 0.006 1219 -0.020*** 0.005
56 -0.018*** 0.006 1504 -0.016*** 0.005
81 -0.018*** 0.006 1506 -0.018*** 0.006
90 -0.018*** 0.006 1509 -0.018*** 0.006
92 -0.019*** 0.005 2473 -0.017*** 0.005
99 -0.018*** 0.006 2573 -0.018*** 0.005
112 -0.018*** 0.006 2904 -0.021*** 0.005
113 -0.018*** 0.006 2932 -0.020*** 0.006
117 -0.019*** 0.006 2964 -0.017*** 0.005
151 -0.018*** 0.006 2971 -0.020*** 0.005
153 -0.019*** 0.006 3332 -0.019*** 0.005
159 -0.019*** 0.006 3539 -0.018*** 0.006
160 -0.018*** 0.006 3721 -0.020*** 0.005
180 -0.018*** 0.006 4034 -0.017*** 0.005
182 -0.015*** 0.005
199 -0.019*** 0.006
228 -0.019*** 0.006
231 -0.018*** 0.006
551 -0.018*** 0.006
861 -0.019*** 0.006
944 -0.018*** 0.006
954 -0.019*** 0.006
957 -0.019*** 0.006
1052 -0.018*** 0.006
Notes: The table reports estimates for the dummy mandatory ref. (mun) where each time a municipality is left out from the sample. The
dependent variable is decentralization which is calculated as municipal share of cantonal and municipal expenditures. The independent variable
are the same used in column (3) of Table 4. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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